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Abstract—Recent studies exploited external periodic syn-
chronous signals to synchronize a pair of network nodes to
address a threat of delaying the communications between the
nodes. However, the sensing-based synchronization may yield
faults due to nonmalicious signal and sensor noises. This paper
considers a system of N nodes that will fuse their peer-to-peer
synchronization results to correct the faults. Our analysis gives
the lower bound of the number of faults that the system can
tolerate when N is up to 12. If the number of faults is no
greater than the lower bound, the faults can be identified and
corrected. We also prove that the system cannot tolerate more
than N −2 faults. Our results can guide the design of resilient
sensing-based clock synchronization systems.
Keywords-Clock synchronization, fault tolerance
I. INTRODUCTION
For distributed systems such as sensor networks, accurate
clock synchronization among the distributed nodes is im-
portant. Correct timestamps make sense data; synchronized
clocks enable punctual coordinated operations among the
nodes. In contrast, desynchronized clocks will undermine
system performance and even lead to physical damages
and system disruptions in time-critical systems. However,
various factors present significant challenges to maintain
resilient clock synchronization of distributed systems, such
as large network sizes, deep embedding of the nodes into
complex physical environments with various disturbances,
and exposure of the systems to cybersecurity threats.
Network Time Protocol (NTP) [1] is the foremost means
of clock synchronization that is widely known and adopted.
Its design principle of estimating the offset between the
clocks of a pair of nodes based on the network transmission
delays of the synchronization packets is also a basis for
many other clock synchronization protocols such as Preci-
sion Time Protocol (PTP) [2] for industrial Ethernets and
RBS [3], TPSN [4], and FTSP [5] for sensor networks.
However, as discussed in RFC 7384 [6], the NTP princi-
ple is susceptible to various cybersecurity threats. While
most of the vulnerabilities can be solved by conventional
security measures such as cryptographic authentication and
encryption, a simple packet delay attack that delays the
transmissions of the synchronization packets has remained as
an open issue that cannot be solved by conventional security
measures [6]–[8].
To address the packet delay attack, our previous studies
[9], [10] have developed sensing-based clock synchroniza-
tion approaches exploiting external periodic signals that are
practically difficult for the attacker to tamper with or jam.
Specifically, in [9], the minute fluctuations of the power grid
voltage cycle lengths, which are similar across a geographic
area served by the same power grid, are used as a time
fingerprint to develop a clock synchronization approach that
is secure against the packet delay attack. In [10], the power
grid voltage phase, which is nearly identical anytime within
a city-scale power grid, is integrated into the NTP principle
and achieve the security against the packet delay attack as
long as a verifiable condition is satisfied.
These sensing-based approaches focus on the peer-to-peer
(p2p) clock synchronization for a node pair. Although they
well address the cybersecurity concern regarding the packet
delay attack, they may be susceptible to the process noises
of the external signals and sensor hardware noises/faults.
For instance, as shown in [9], an insufficiently long time
fingerprint may lead to faults in estimating the clock offset
between a pair of nodes. In [10], when the round-trip time of
an NTP synchronization session exceeds twice of the power
grid voltage cycle, the approach will yield multiple clock
offset estimates, causing ambiguity. Given the criticality of
trustworthy clock synchronization, it is important to develop
methods with understood resilience bounds to deal with the
nonmalicious synchronization faults of the sensing-based
clock synchronization approaches.
In this paper, based on a general class of p2p sensing-
based clock synchronization, we study the resilience of
network clock synchronization for a network of N nodes
against the p2p synchronization faults. Upon the occur-
rence of a fault between a pair of nodes, the measured
offset between the two nodes’ clocks will have an error
of a multiple of the period of the used external signal.
In the network clock synchronization, every node pair in
the network performs a p2p clock synchronization session
and returns the measured clock offset to a central node.
Based on a total of
(
N
2
)
clock offset measurements, the
central node uses an algorithm to estimate the offsets of
all nodes’ clocks from a selected reference node’s clock,
while accounting for the possible p2p synchronization faults.
Specifically, each step of the algorithm assumes that k
out of totally
(
N
2
)
p2p synchronization sessions are faulty,
exhaustively tests all possible
((N2 )
k
)
distributions of these
faulty p2p synchronization sessions, and yields a solution
once the estimated clock offsets and the estimated p2p clock
synchronization faults agree with all the p2p clock offset
Table I
LOWER BOUND OF TOLERABLE FAULTS.
N 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Lower bound of 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 5 5
tolerable faults
Lower bound of 17 10 13 10 7 8 7 9 8
tolerance (%)
measurements. Starting from k = 0, the algorithm increases
k by one in each step and terminates once a solution is
found. Thus, this algorithm does not require any run-time
knowledge about the p2p synchronization faults, including
the number of the faults and their distribution among the(
N
2
)
p2p synchronization sessions.
Based on the algorithm, we inquire basic questions regard-
ing the scaling laws of system resilience, such as how many
p2p synchronization faults that any N -node system can
tolerate in that the algorithm will not give wrong estimates
of the clock offsets and the p2p clock synchronization faults.
Our analysis gives the lower bound of the number of p2p
synchronization faults that any N -node system can tolerate
when N is up to 12. The result is given in Table I. If
the number of faults is no greater than the lower bound,
the faults can be identified and corrected by the algorithm.
By defining the tolerance as the ratio between the number
of tolerable faults to the total number of p2p synchroniza-
tion sessions, the third row of Table I shows the lower
bound of the tolerance. Our results can guide the design
of network clock synchronization systems with potential p2p
synchronization faults. Moreover, we prove that any N -node
system with N ≥ 3 cannot tolerate more than N − 2 p2p
synchronization faults.
When the number of faults is greater than the lower bound
given in Table I and no greater than the N−2 upper bound,
whether the system can tolerate the faults is still an open
issue. It is of great interest for future research to explore the
tight bound of the fault tolerance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II reviews related work. Section III introduces the
background and states the problem. Section IV analyzes the
resilience bounds. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Highly stable time sources are often ill-suited for sensor
networks. Despite initial study of using chip-scale atomic
clock (CSAC) on sensor platforms [11], CSAC is still too
expensive ($1,500 per unit [11]) for wide adoption. The
Global Positioning System (GPS) and several timekeeping
radio stations (e.g., WWVB in U.S.) can provide highly
stable global time. However, GPS and radio receivers have
various limitations such as high power consumption, poor
signal reception in indoor environments (e.g., 47% good time
for WWVB [12]), and susceptibility to wireless spoofing
attacks [13]. Thus, GPS and radio receivers are often used
on a limited number of time masters with clear sky views,
carefully installed antennas, and sufficient physical air gap
to provide global time to a large number of slave nodes
via some clock synchronization protocol (e.g., NTP). The
resilience of this clock synchronization protocol between the
master and the slaves is the focus of this paper.
Various sensing-based approaches exploit external peri-
odic signals for clock synchronization [9], [10], [14], time
fingerprinting [9], [15]–[17], and clock calibration [18]–
[21]. Time fingerprinting approaches focus on studying
the global time information embedded in the sensing data
such as microseisms [15], sunlight [16], and powerline
electromagnetic radiation (EMR) [17]. They can be a basis
for clock synchronization. For instance, the secure clock
synchronization approach in [9] is based on the time fin-
gerprints found in power grid voltage. These studies focus
on the p2p synchronization. In this paper, we study the
resilience bounds of network clock synchronization against
p2p synchronization faults.
Different from clock synchronization that ensures the
clocks to have the same value, clock calibration ensures dif-
ferent clocks to advance at the same speed. The approaches
presented in [18]–[21] exploit powerline EMR, fluorescent
lamp flickering, Wi-Fi beacons, and FM Radio Data System
broadcasts to calibrate clocks. However, clock calibration
does not address the resilience issues of clock synchro-
nization. In particular, the sensing-based clock calibration
is also prone to faults that can subvert the network clock
synchronization.
The resilience of network clock synchronization against
Byzantine clock faults has been studied [22], [23]. A
Byzantine faulty clock gives an arbitrary clock value when-
ever being read. It has been proved that, to guarantee the
synchronization of non-faulty clocks in the presence of
m faulty clocks, a total of at least (3m + 1) clocks are
needed. Different from the Byzantine faulty clock model,
we consider faulty p2p synchronization sessions between
clocks. The conversion of our problem to the Byzantine
clock synchronization problem by considering either node
involving a faulty p2p synchronization session as a faulty
clock is invalid, because this faulty clock after the conversion
is not a Byzantine faulty clock, unless all p2p synchroniza-
tion sessions involving this clock are faulty. As our problem
does not have this assumption, the resilience bound obtained
in [22], [23] is not applicable to our problem.
III. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Background and Preliminaries
1) Sensing-based p2p clock synchronization: This section
describes the principle of the sensing-based p2p clock syn-
chronization that exploits external periodic signals. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the external periodic
signals sensed by the two peers, nodes A and B, are two
synchronous Dirac combs with the same period T . Fig. 1
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Figure 1. Principle of sensing-based p2p clock synchronization.
illustrates the two Dirac combs in the same Newtonian
time frame. The objective of the sensing-based p2p clock
synchronization is to estimate the offset between A’s and
B’s clocks by using the Dirac combs.
To simplify the analysis of the clock offset estimation,
we assume that A’s and B’s clocks advance at the same
speed, such that the offset between the two clocks is a
constant within a concerned time period before any clock is
adjusted according to the estimated clock offset to achieve
clock synchronization. In existing sensing-based p2p clock
synchronization approaches [9], [10], [14], a synchronization
session, i.e., the process of estimating the clock offset, takes
a short time (e.g., tens of milliseconds in [10]). Typical
crystal oscillators found in microcontrollers and personal
computers have drift rates of 30 to 50 parts-per-million
(ppm) [20]. Thus, the change of the clock offset during
a synchronization session of 100 milliseconds is at most
5 microseconds only, whereas the clock offset estimation
errors of successful synchronization sessions are at sub-
millisecond [9], [10] or milliseconds levels [14] in practice.
Thus, the clock offset estimation errors caused by signal
noises are much larger than those caused by the two peers’
different clock speeds.
2) Fault model: A synchronization session is successful
(or non-faulty) if it identifies the correspondence between
an A’s Dirac impulse and a B’s Dirac impulse that occur
at the same Newtonian time instant; otherwise, the synchro-
nization session is faulty. Since the two Dirac combs are
synchronous, a successful synchronization session gives a
zero clock offset estimation error, whereas a faulty synchro-
nization session gives a clock offset estimation error of nT ,
where n is a non-zero integer.
3) Other related issues: It has been shown in [9], [10],
if the Dirac combs are practically difficult for the attacker
to tamper with or jam, the sensing-based p2p clock syn-
chronization can address the packet delay attack, which
is an open issue that cannot be solved by conventional
security measures [6]–[8]. However, due to process noises
of the external signals and sensor hardware noises/faults,
the sensing-based p2p synchronization can be faulty. For
self-containment of this paper, Appendix A reviews the
detailed reasons of the faults. In this paper, we focus on
the fault tolerance of sensing-based synchronization. Built
upon the secure p2p synchronization [9], [10], the clock
synchronization approach presented in this paper is resilient
against both the packet delay attacks and synchronization
faults.
We note that, in practice, the two Dirac combs may not
be perfectly synchronous. For instance, in [9], [10], the time
displacement between the two Dirac combs is about 0.05%
to 0.5% of T . This time displacement is the major source of
the clock offset estimation error. As the time displacements
are much smaller than the synchronization faults (i.e., nT ),
we can easily classify successful and faulty synchronization
sessions by comparing the clock offset estimation error with
a threshold (e.g., T2 ). For simplicity of exposition, we ignore
the time displacement in our analysis regarding the system
resilience against faulty synchronization sessions.
B. Network Clock Synchronization
To improve the robustness of clock synchronization
against p2p synchronization faults, this section proposes
an approach to cross-check the p2p synchronization results
among multiple nodes and correct the faults if present.
Consider a system of N nodes: {n0, n1, ...nN−1}. Let δij
denote the offset between the clocks of ni and nj , which
is unknown and to be estimated. Specifically, δij = ci(t)−
cj(t), where ci(t) and cj(t) are the clock values of ni and
nj at any given time instant t, respectively. As discussed in
Section III-A, we assume that δij is time-invariant. By desig-
nating n0 as the reference node, we have δij = δi0−δj0. Any
pair of two nodes, ni and nj , will perform a synchronization
session using the sensing-based p2p clock synchronization to
measure δij . Denote by ni ↔ nj the synchronization session
between ni and nj . Denote by δ˜ij the measured clock offset.
If the synchronization session is successful, δ˜ij = δij ; if the
synchronization session is faulty, δ˜ij = δij + eij , where eij
is the p2p synchronization fault. Every node pair performs
a p2p synchronization session. Thus, there will be a total of(
N
2
)
= N(N−1)2 p2p synchronization sessions.
All the
N(N−1)
2 clock offset measurements are transmit-
ted to a central node, which runs a fault-tolerate network
clock synchronization algorithm. Denote by δˆij and eˆij the
estimates for δij and eij , respectively. A general equation
system assuming all the p2p synchronization sessions are
faulty is{
δˆj0 + eˆj0 = δ˜j0, ∀j ∈ [1, N − 1];
δˆi0 − δˆj0 + eˆij = δ˜ij , ∀i, j ∈ [1, N − 1], i > j.
(1)
The variables to be solved are the unknowns {δˆj0|∀j ∈
[1, N − 1]} and {eˆij|∀i, j ∈ [0, N − 1], i > j}, where δˆj0
is the estimated clock offset between nj and the reference
Algorithm 1 Fault-tolerate network clock synchronization.
Given: {δ˜ij |∀i, j ∈ [0, N − 1], i > j}
Output: {δˆij , eˆij |∀i, j ∈ [0, N − 1], i > j}
1: k = 0
2: while k ≤ N(N−1)
2
do
3: for each distribution of the k estimated p2p synchronization
faults among the N(N−1)
2
p2p synchronization sessions do
4: if the corresponding Eq. (1) has a solution then
5: return {δˆij , eˆij |∀i, j ∈ [0, N − 1], i > j}
6: end if
7: end for
8: k = k + 1
9: end while
node n0; eˆij is the estimated p2p clock synchronization fault
between ni and nj .
If the network clock synchronization algorithm considers
that a total of k p2p synchronization sessions are faulty, it
keeps k estimated p2p synchronization faults (i.e., eˆij) in
Eq. (1) and removes other estimated p2p synchronization
faults. Thus, there will be
(N(N−1)
2
k
)
possible distributions of
the k estimated p2p synchronization faults among a total of
N(N−1)
2 p2p synchronization sessions. Algorithm 1 shows
the pseudocode of algorithm. It starts by assuming there are
no faults (i.e., k = 0). In each iteration that increases k by
one, it solves Eq. (1) for all possible distributions of the
k estimated p2p synchronization faults. Once a solution is
found, Algorithm 1 returns.
Algorithm 1 requires neither the number nor the distribu-
tion of the actual p2p synchronization faults. Whether it can
correct the faults and how many faults it can tolerate will be
the focus of this paper. Algorithm 1 is executed on a central
node; its fault tolerance performance, which is the focus of
this paper, will provide important understanding.
C. Problem Statement
Definition 1 (K-resilience). Let K ∈ Z≥0 denote the
number of faulty p2p synchronization sessions among a total
of
N(N−1)
2 sessions in an N -node system. The system with
Algorithm 1 is K-resilient if the algorithm can correct any
K non-zero p2p synchronization faults.
From Algorithm 1, we define the K-resilience condition
that can be used to check whether a system is K-resilient.
Definition 2 (K-resilience condition). A system with Al-
gorithm 1 is K-resilient if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1) ∀k ∈ [0,K), Eq. (1) constructed with any distribution
of the K actual p2p synchronization faults and any
distribution of the k estimated p2p synchronization
faults has no solutions;
2) When k = K , for any distribution of the K actual
p2p synchronization faults and any distribution of the
k estimated p2p synchronization faults,
a) if the distribution of the k estimated p2p syn-
chronization faults is identical to the distribution
of the actual faults, Eq. (1) has a unique solution;
b) otherwise, Eq. (1) has no solutions.
Note that in the condition 2)-a) of Definition 2, the unique
solution must give the correct estimates of the clock offsets
and the p2p synchronization faults.
We aim at analyzing the following resilience bounds:
Definition 3 (Lower bound of maximum resilience). A
function fl(N) is a lower bound of maximum resilience
if any N -node system with Algorithm 1 is K-resilient for
K ≤ fl(N).
Definition 4 (Upper bound of maximum resilience). A
function fu(N) is a upper bound of maximum resilience
if any N -node system with Algorithm 1 is not K-resilient
for K > fu(N).
Definition 5 (Tight bound of maximum resilience). A func-
tion ft(N) is a tight bound of maximum resilience if any N -
node system with Algorithm 1 is K-resilient for K ≤ ft(N)
and not K-resilient for K > ft(N).
IV. VECTORIZATION AND K -RESILIENCE
A. Vectorization
We vectorize the representation of Eq. (1) that is solved by
Line 4 of Algorithm 1. Define δˆ ∈ RN−1 composed of all
clock offset estimates, i.e., δˆ =
(
δˆ10, δˆ20, . . . , δˆ(N−1)0
)⊺
.
Define eˆ ∈ Rk composed of the k p2p synchronization fault
estimates. Eq. (1) can be rewritten as (A1A2)
(
δˆ
eˆ
)
= b,
where A1 ∈ R
N(N−1)
2 ×(N−1) and A2 ∈ R
N(N−1)
2 ×k
are two matrices composed of -1, 0, and 1 containing
coefficients corresponding to δˆ·0 and eˆ··, respectively; the
vector b ∈ R
N(N−1)
2 consists of all the measured clock
offsets. To simplify notation, we define A = (A1A2) and
x =
(
δˆ
eˆ
)
. From the Rouche´-Capelli theorem [24], the
necessary and sufficient condition that Ax = b has no
solutions is rank(A|b) 6= rank(A), where A|b is the
augmented matrix.
B. K-Resilience under Certain Settings
This section presents the analysis on the K-resilience of
an N -node system with Algorithm 1 under certain settings
of K and N . This analysis provides insights into the more
general analysis of the lower/upper bounds of maximum
resilience.
Proposition 1. A 3-node system is not 1-resilient.
Proof: Consider a case where the p2p synchronization
session n1 ↔ n2 is faulty. When k = 0 in Algorithm 1, the
vectorized equation system in Eq. (1) is 1 00 1
−1 1
 ( δˆ10
δˆ20
)
=
 δ10δ20
δ20 − δ10 + e21
 .
⇑ ⇑ ⇑
A x b
Note that A2 and eˆ are empty. With e21 6= 0, Gaussian
elimination shows that rank(A|b) 6= rank(A). Thus, the
equation system has no solutions and Algorithm 1 will move
on to the case of k = 1. The algorithm will attempt to test
all the
N(N−1)
2 = 3 possible cases of a single faulty p2p
synchronization session. For instance, when the algorithm
assumes that n0 ↔ n1 is faulty, the equation system is 1 0 10 1 0
−1 1 0
 δˆ10δˆ20
eˆ10
 =
 δ10δ20
δ20 − δ10 + e21
 .
With e21 6= 0, we have rank(A|b) = rank(A) and A has
full column rank. Thus, the equation system has a unique
solution. Therefore, the condition 2)-b) of Definition 2 is not
satisfied and the 3-node system is not 1-resilient. In fact, the
unique solution must be a wrong solution, which is {δˆ10 =
δ10 − e21, δˆ20 = δ20, eˆ10 = e21}.
Proposition 2. A 4-node system is 1-resilient.
We provide a sketch of the proof as follows instead of the
complete proof due to space limit. Consider a case where
the p2p synchronization session n0 ↔ n2 is faulty. When
k = 0 in Algorithm 1, similar to Proposition 1, the equation
system has no solutions and Algorithm 1 will move on to the
case of k = 1. The algorithm will test all the N(N−1)2 = 6
possible cases of a single faulty p2p synchronization session.
For instance, when the algorithm assumes n0 ↔ n1 is faulty,
the vectorized equation system is
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
−1 1 0 0
0 −1 1 0
−1 0 1 0


δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ10
 =

δ10
δ20 + e20
δ30
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ20
δ30 − δ10
 . (2)
As rank(A|b) 6= rank(A), the equation system has no
solutions. An exhaustive check shows that, only when the
algorithm assumes the synchronization session between n0
and n2 is faulty, the equation system has a unique solution
(i.e., rank(A|b) = rank(A) and A has full column rank).
Thus, the algorithm can correct the fault. In fact, it can be
verified that, for the 4-node system, no matter which p2p
synchronization session is faulty, the algorithm can correct
the fault. Therefore, the 4-node system is 1-resilient.
Proposition 3. A 4-node system is not 2-resilient.
Proof: Consider the 4-node system with two faulty p2p
synchronization sessions: n0 ↔ n1 and n0 ↔ n2. When
k = 0, the equation system has no solutions. When k = 1,
consider a case where n0 ↔ n3 is assumed to be faulty by
the algorithm. The vectorized equation system is
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
−1 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0
0 −1 1 0


δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ30
 =

δ10 + e10
δ20 + e20
δ30
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ10
δ30 − δ20
 . (3)
If e10 6= e20, rank(A|b) 6= rank(A) and the equation sys-
tem has no solutions. However, if e10 = e20, rank(A|b) =
rank(A) and A has full column rank; the equation system
has a unique wrong solution of {δˆ10 = δ10 + e10, δˆ20 =
δ20 + e10, δˆ30 = δ30 + e10, eˆ30 = −e10}. Although this
counterexample against the 4-node system’s 2-resilience is
obtained under a certain condition of e10 = e20, we can
conclude that the 4-node system is not 2-resilient.
To gain more insights, we also analyze a case of k = 2
with n0 ↔ n1 and n0 ↔ n3 assumed to be faulty by the
algorithm. The vectorized equation system is


1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1
−1 1 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0




δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ10
eˆ30

=


δ10 + e10
δ20 + e20
δ30
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ10
δ30 − δ20


. (4)
As rank(A|b) = rank(A) and A has full column rank,
the equation system has a unique solution, which violates
the 2-resilience condition. In fact, the equation system has a
unique wrong solution that does not require any relationship
between e10 and e20: {δˆ10 = δ10+e20, δˆ20 = δ20+e20, δˆ30 =
δ30 + e20, eˆ10 = e10 − e20, eˆ30 = −e20}.
Proposition 4. A 5-node system is 1-resilient.
We provide a sketch of the proof as follows instead of
the complete proof due to space limit. Consider a 5-node
system with one p2p synchronization fault. The resilience
is independent from how we name the nodes. We name the
two involving nodes of the faulty synchronization session to
be n0 and n1. An exhaustive check over all the
(
5
2
)
possible
cases for a single assumed faulty synchronization session
shows that the 1-resilience condition is satisfied. Thus, the
5-node system is 1-resilient.
Proposition 5. A 5-node system is not 2-resilient.
Proof: We consider a 5-node system, in which (i) the
p2p synchronization sessions n0 ↔ n1 and n1 ↔ n4 are
faulty and (ii) the p2p synchronization sessions n1 ↔ n2
and n1 ↔ n3 are assumed by the algorithm to be faulty.
The vectorized equation system is


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
−1 1 0 0 1 0
−1 0 1 0 0 1
−1 0 0 1 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0




δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
δˆ40
eˆ21
eˆ31


=


δ10 + e10
δ20
δ30
δ40
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ10
δ40−δ10+e41
δ30 − δ20
δ40 − δ20
δ40 − δ30


. (5)
If e10 = −e41, the equation system has a unique solution of
{δˆ10 = δ10 + e10, δˆ20 = δ20, δˆ30 = δ30, δˆ40 = δ40, eˆ21 =
e10, eˆ31 = e10}, which violates the resilience condition.
Thus, a 5-node system is not 2-resilient.
C. Re-Vectorization
In Section IV-B, we adopt an approach of enumerating
counterexamples to prove that a system is not K-resilient.
As shown in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5, if the
actual faults satisfy certain conditions, the rank of A|b may
change, presenting a pitfall to the approach of enumerating
counterexamples. This motivates us to consider the actual
faults as the variables of the equation system in Eq. (1).
The following re-vectorization will be used in Section V-A
to derive the lower bound of maximum resilience.
By defining a vector e ∈ RK composed of the K actual
p2p synchronization faults, we can reformat Ax = b to
include the actual faults into the vector of unknowns:
A
′
x
′ = b′,where x′ =
 δˆeˆ
e
 ,A′ = (A1A2A3) , (6)
A3 ∈ R
N(N−1)
2 ×K is a matrix corresponding to e, b′ ∈
R
N(N−1)
2 consists of the actual clock offsets.
The re-vectorization of the equation systems in Eqs. (2),
(3), and (4) are respectively given by

1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0




δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ10
e20

=


δ10
δ20
δ30
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ20
δ30 − δ10


, (7)


1 0 0 0 −1 0
0 1 0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 1 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0




δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ30
e10
e20


=


δ10
δ20
δ30
δ20−δ10
δ30−δ10
δ30−δ20


,
(8)


1 0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0 0




δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ10
eˆ30
e10
e20


=


δ10
δ20
δ30
δ20−δ10
δ30−δ10
δ30−δ20


, (9)
In Eq. (7), rank(A′|b) = rank(A′) and A′ has full
column rank. Thus, Eq. (7) has a unique solution, which
is {δˆ10 = δ10, δˆ20 = δ20, δˆ30 = δ30, eˆ10 = 0, e20 = 0}.
This is consistent with the observation in the proof sketch
of Proposition 2 that Ax = b has no solutions if e20 6= 0.
In Eq. (8), rank(A′|b) = rank(A′) and A′ is not full
column ranked. Thus, A′x′ = b′ has an infinite number of
solutions. Applying Guassian elimination to Eq. (8) gives
{δˆ10 = δ10 + e10, δˆ20 = δ20 + e10, δˆ30 = δ30 + e10, eˆ30 =
−e10, e20 = e10}, where e10 and e20 are considered as
variables in A′x′ = b′, not as constants in Ax = b. The
above result means that there exist non-zero e10 and e20
such that the solution of Ax = b is wrong.
In Eq. (9), rank(A′|b) = rank(A′) and A′ is not full
column ranked. Thus, A′x′ = b′ has an infinite number of
solutions. Applying Gaussian elimination to Eq. (9) gives
the relationship derived in the proof of Proposition 3, i.e.,
{δˆ10 = δ10 + e20, δˆ20 = δ20 + e20, δˆ30 = δ30 + e20, eˆ10 =
e10 − e20, eˆ30 = −e20}, where e10 and e20 are considered
as variables in A′x′ = b′, not as constants in Ax = b. The
above result also shows that there exist non-zero e10 and e20
such that the solution of Ax = b is wrong.
From the above examples, we can see that the solution to
re-vectorization captures the condition that the actual faults
need to satisfy such that the Ax = b will give wrong
solutions.
V. BOUNDS OF MAXIMUM RESILIENCE
A. Lower Bound of Maximum Resilience
In this section, we first develop two lemmas, Lemma 1
and Lemma 2. The proof of Lemma 2 uses Lemma 1.
Then, we prove Proposition 6 using Lemma 2. Proposition 6
gives a sufficient condition that a system is K-resilient.
This condition can be used to compute the lower bound of
maximum resilience for any N -node system.
Lemma 1. A′x′ = b′ always has one or more solutions.
When A′ has full column rank, the original Ax = b either
has no solutions or has a unique correct solution.
Proof: The x′ satisfying (i) δˆj0 = δj0, ∀j ∈ [1, N − 1],
(ii) eˆ = 0, and (iii) e = 0 must be a solution. We
denote this solution as x′0. As shown in previous examples,
A
′
x
′ = b′ can have an infinite number of solutions. There-
fore, rank(A′|b′) = rank(A′) always holds and A′x′ = b′
always has one or more solutions.
When A′ has full column rank, A′x′ = b′ has a unique
solution that must be x′0. The e = 0 in this solution
means that the original Ax = b does not allow any p2p
synchronization fault. We now consider two cases. First, in
the presence of any p2p synchronization fault, the Ax = b
must have no solutions; otherwise, the solution of Ax = b
conflicts with the unique solution of A′x′ = b′ with e = 0.
Second, in the absence of synchronization fault, the unique
solution x′0 encompasses the unique correct solution of
Ax = b.
We say that an estimated p2p synchronization fault is cor-
rectly positioned if the corresponding p2p synchronization
session is truly faulty. For example, in Eq. (9), the eˆ10 is
correctly positioned, but the eˆ30 is not correctly positioned.
Lemma 2. When rank(A′) = N − 1 + k +K − l, where
l ∈ [0, k] is the number of correctly positioned estimated
p2p synchronization faults, the original Ax = b either has
no solutions or has a unique correct solution.
Proof: We define three sets: (1) E is the set of the
subscripts of the estimated p2p synchronization faults, (2) A
is the set of the subscripts of the actual p2p synchronization
faults, (3) C is the set of the subscripts of the correctly
positioned estimated p2p synchronization faults.
When l = 0, the given condition rank(A′) = N−1+k+
K− l ensures that A′ has full column rank. From Lemma 1,
Ax = b has either no solutions or a unique correct solution.
The rest of the proof considers l ∈ (0, k]. We now prove
that the S = {δˆi0 = δi0, eˆmn = emn, eˆpq = 0, exy = 0|∀i ∈
[1, N−1], ∀mn ∈ C, ∀pq ∈ E \C, ∀xy ∈ A\C} is the entire
solution space of A′x′ = b′. First, clearly, S is a solution
subspace of A′x′ = b′, because it is the correct solution to
a system with l actual non-zero p2p synchronization faults
and correct distribution of the estimated p2p synchronization
faults. The dimension of S is the cardinality of C (i.e., l),
because only the {emn|∀mn ∈ C} are the free variables.
Second, as rank(A′) = N − 1+ k+K − l and the number
of variables is N − 1 + k +K , the dimension of the entire
solution space is (N − 1 + k + K) − (N − 1 + k + K −
l) = l. From the above two statements, the solution subspace
and the entire solution space of A′x′ = b′ have the same
dimension. From the uniqueness of the solution space of
linear equation system, the S is the entire solution space of
A
′
x
′ = b′.
The S’s condition exy = 0, ∀xy ∈ A \ C means
that the original Ax = b does not allow any actual
p2p synchronization fault without a corresponding estimated
p2p synchronization fault. In the absence of K actual p2p
synchronization faults, the unique solution S encompasses
the unique correct solution of Ax = b. In the presence of
K actual p2p synchronization faults, there are two cases.
1) If l=k=K , S is the unique correct solution of Ax =
b;
2) Otherwise, we must have l < K . As a result, the
Ax = b must have no solutions, because otherwise
the fact that S allows l non-zero actual p2p synchro-
nization faults only conflicts with the fact that there
are K non-zero actual p2p synchronization faults.
Based on Lemma 2, the following proposition can be used
to compute the lower bound of maximum resilience.
Algorithm 2 Compute a lower bound of maximum resilience
Given: The number of nodes N
Output: A lower bound of maximum resilience
1: K = 0
2: while K ≤ (N − 2) do
3: for each distribution of the K actual p2p synchronization
faults among the
N(N−1)
2
p2p synchronization sessions do
4: k = 0
5: while k ≤ K do
6: for each distribution of the k estimated faults among
the N(N−1)
2
p2p synchronization sessions do
7: determine the value of l (i.e., the number of cor-
rectly positioned estimated faults)
8: if rank(A′) 6= N − 1 + k +K − l then
9: return K − 1
10: end if
11: end for
12: k = k + 1
13: end while
14: end for
15: K = K + 1
16: end while
Proposition 6. A system is K-resilient if ∀k ∈ [0,K], for
any distribution of the K actual p2p synchronization faults
and any distribution of the k estimated p2p synchronization
faults, rank(A′) = N − 1 + k +K − l, where l ∈ [0, k] is
the number of correctly positioned estimated p2p synchro-
nization faults.
Proof: As rank(A′) = N−1+k+K−l, from Lemma 1,
the original Ax = b either has no solutions or has a unique
correct solution. We now analyze the cases considered in
Definition 2:
1) When k ∈ [0,K), since k < K , the solution of
Ax = b cannot be correct. Thus, the Ax = b has
no solutions.
2) When k = K ,
a) if the distribution of the k estimated p2p synchro-
nization faults is identical to the distribution of
the actual synchronization faults, as the statement
that Ax = b has no solution must not be
true (because the correct solution is a solution),
Ax = b must have a unique (and correct)
solution.
b) otherwise, since the distributions are different,
the solution of Ax = b cannot be correct. Thus,
the Ax = b has no solutions.
In summary, rank(A′) = N − 1 + k +K − l ensures that
the K-resilience condition is satisfied.
Based on Proposition 6, Algorithm 2 computes a lower
bound of maximum resilience for any N -node system.
Specifically, by starting with no synchronization faults (i.e.,
K = 0), it increases K by one in each step of the outer
loop to check whether the N -node system isK-resilient. The
condition of K ≤ (N − 2) in Line 2 is from Proposition 7
A =
δˆ10 · · · δˆ(N−1)0 eˆ10 eˆ12 · · · eˆ1(N−1) · · ·

n0 ↔ n1 1 · · · · 1 0 · · · 0 · · ·
n0 ↔ n2 0 · · · · 0 0 · · · 0 · · ·
ni ↔ nj , ∀i, j 6= 1
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
nN−2 ↔ nN−1 0 · · · · 0 0 · · · 0 · · ·
n1 ↔ n2 −1 · · · · 0 1 · · · 0 · · ·
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
n1 ↔ nN−1 −1 · · · · 0 0 · · · 1 · · ·
. (10)
that the system is not K-resilient if K > (N−2). The loops
from Line 3 to Line 6 will generate all possible combinations
of the distributions of actual and estimated synchronization
faults. In Line 8, we check whether the sufficient condition
in Proposition 6 is met. If not, the current value of K has
already exceeded the lower bound of maximum resilience.
Thus, the algorithm returns K − 1 as the lower bound.
Table I shows the results computed by Algorithm 2 for
N up to 12. We can see that the lower bound of maximum
resilience is a non-decreasing function of N , which is con-
sistent with intuition. We also compute the lower bound of
tolerance as fl(N)/
N(N−1)
2 , i.e., the percentage of the faulty
p2p synchronization sessions to ensure correct network clock
synchronization. The last row of Table I shows the lower
bound of tolerance.
B. Upper Bounds of Maximum Resilience
Proposition 7. fu(N) = N − 2 is an upper bound of
maximum resilience, i.e., any N -node system is not K-
resilient when K > (N − 2).
Proof: We prove by an counterexample where all the
N − 1 p2p synchronization sessions involving the node
n1 are faulty. The remaining K − (N − 1) faulty p2p
synchronization sessions may occur between any other node
pairs. Consider that Algorithm 1 is testing a distribution of
the K p2p synchronization faults that is identical to the
actual distribution. Since the true clock offsets and the true
p2p synchronization faults must form a valid solution to the
equation system, we have rank(A|b) = rank(A).
The matrix A of the vectorized equation system is given
by Eq. (10). We add labels to help understanding each
column’s corresponding unknown to be solved and each
row’s corresponding p2p synchronization session. In the first
column of A that corresponds to the clock offset estimate
δˆ10, the first element and the last N − 2 elements that
correspond to all p2p synchronization sessions involving
n1 are non-zeros; all other elements are zero. This column
is a linear combination of the columns corresponding to
eˆ10, eˆ12, . . . , eˆ1(N−1). Thus, A is not full column ranked.
Therefore, the equation system Ax = b have an infinite
number of solutions, which violates the resilience condition.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studies how many p2p synchronization faults
that an N -node system can tolerate in achieving network
clock synchronization. Table I gives the lower bound of
maximum resilience under certain settings of N . We also
prove that N − 2 is an upper bound of maximum resilience.
It is interesting to study the following issues not addressed
in this paper:
1) The tight bound of maximum resilience is still an
open issue. However, even if the upper bound given by
Proposition 7 is tight, the tolerance (N − 2)/N(N−1)2
still decreases with N when N ≥ 4. It suggests that
increasing the number of nodes is not beneficial in
terms of fault tolerance. In future work, we will study
how to reduce the number of p2p synchronization
sessions and examine whether doing so can improve
the fault tolerance.
2) Algorithm 1 and our analysis do not exploit the
property that each fault is a multiple of T . If this
discrete property is used, intuitively, the fault tolerance
can be improved.
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APPENDIX
A. Sensing-based P2P Synchronization Faults
1) Time fingerprinting approaches: The studies [9], [17]
show that the cycle length (i.e., T ) of the power grid voltage
[9] and the associated powerline EMR [17] has transient
minute fluctuations over time in the order of 500 parts per
million. The fluctuations at the same time in a geographic
area served by the same power grid (e.g., a city) are nearly
identical. Thus, a vector of successive cycle lengths is a time
fingerprint. By matching a time fingerprint captured by A
against B’s historical time fingerprints that are timestamped
respectively according to their clocks, the offset between A’s
and B’s clocks can be estimated with a potential error of nT .
If the time fingerprint length is sufficiently long, empirical
zero error probability has been achieved [9], [17]. However,
the possibility of errors cannot be precluded.
2) Dirac-assisted NTP approaches: As illustrated in
Fig. 1, the Dirac-assisted NTP transmits a request packet and
a reply packet and records the transmission and reception
timestamps t1, t2, t3, and t4 according to A’s andB’s clocks.
It also computes the elapsed clock times for t1, t2, t3, and t4
from their respective last impulses (LIs) in the Dirac combs.
These elapsed clock times (i.e., phases) are denoted by φ1,
φ2, φ3, and φ4, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The round-trip time
(RTT) is RTT = (t4 − t1)− (t3 − t2). Define the rounded
phase differences θq and θp (which correspond to the request
and reply packets, respectively) as
θq=
{
φ2−φ1, if φ2−φ1≥0;
φ2−φ1+T, otherwise.
θp=
{
φ4−φ3, if φ4−φ3≥0;
φ4−φ3+T, otherwise.
As analyzed in [10], [14], we haveRTT = θq+θp+(i+j)·T ,
i, j ∈ Z≥0, where the non-negative integers i and j are the
numbers of elapsed periods of the external signals during the
transmissions of the request and reply packets, respectively.
For instance, in Fig. 1, i = 2 and j = 1. Once the
unknown i or j can be determined, the offset between
A’s and B’s clocks can be estimated. However, solving i
and j from RTT = θq + θp + (i + j) · T is an integer-
domain underdetermined problem that generally has multiple
solutions. Arbitrarily choosing one of the candidate solutions
will result in a clock offset estimation error of nT . The
studies [10] and [14] proposed approaches to effectively
reduce the number of candidate solution. However, it is
challenging to ensure no ambiguity.
